Double real radiation corrections to gluon scattering at NNLO

We use the antenna subtraction method to isolate the double real radiation infrared singularities present in the six-gluon tree-level process at next-to-next-to-leading order. We show numerically that the subtraction term correctly approximates the matrix elements in the various single and double unresolved configurations.Comment: six pages, talk given at 10th DESY Workshop on Elementary Particle Theory, Worlitz, 25-30 April 201

Infrared structure of e+e−→3e^+e^- \to 3 jets at NNLO: QED-type contributions

The NNLO QCD corrections to the $e^+e^- \to 3$ jets can be decomposed according to their colour factors. Out of the seven colour factors, three are of QED-type: $1/N^2$, $N_F/N$ and $N_F^2$. We use the antenna subtraction method to compute these contributions, providing complete expressions for the subtraction terms in $N_F/N$ and $N_F^2$.Comment: Talk presented at Loops and Legs 2006, Eisenac

Mechanistic artefact explanation

One thing about technical artefacts that needs to be explained is how their physical make-up, or structure, enables them to fulfil the behaviour associated with their function, or, more colloquially, how they work. In this paper I develop an account of such explanations based on the familiar notion of mechanistic explanation. To accomplish this, I outline two explanatory strategies that provide two different types of insight into an artefact’s functioning, and show how human action inevitably plays a role in artefact explanation. I then use my own account to criticize other recent work on mechanistic explanation and conclude with some general implications for the philosophy of explanation.Keywords: Artefact; Technical function; Explanation; Levels of explanation; Mechanisms

Religious exclusivism unlimited: JEROEN DE RIDDER

Like David Silver before them, Erik Baldwin and Michael Thune argue that the facts of religious pluralism present an insurmountable challenge to the rationality of basic exclusive religious belief as construed by Reformed Epistemology. I will show that their argument is unsuccessful. First, their claim that the facts of religious pluralism make it necessary for the religious exclusivist to support her exclusive beliefs with significant reasons is one that the reformed epistemologist has the resources to reject. Secondly, they fail to demonstrate that it is impossible for basic religious beliefs to return to their properly basic state after defeaters against them have been defeated. Finally, I consider whether there is perhaps a similar but better argument in the neighbourhood and conclude in the negative. Reformed Epistemology's defence of exclusivism thus remains undefeated